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Notes
RErTROACTIV EFFECT OF AN OVERRULING DECISION
UPON a legal system there are continuously pressed two necessarily antithetical
demands-the demand for stability in judicial action and the insistence that
pre-existing rules shall be altered in line with changing conceptions of social
policy.' In the conflict between them, stare decisis becomes modified from a
principle of rigid adherence to precedent to a discretionary rule of action 2
under -which prior decisions will at times be abandoned.3 Usually, earlier
holdings are later disregarded without being overruled. By merely distinguish-
ing, ignoring, or limiting them, 4 courts are able to conceal reversals and thus
to avoid the question of what effect should be given an overruling decision.
In some instances, however, a court feels the necessity of admittedly abandon-
ing a former position, and it is then forced to face the problem. The rejected
precedent may be regarded as never having had any validity,3 in which case
the overruling decision would have to be applied retroactively to fill the gap
in the law thus created. Or the court may consider that the precedent now
overruled was nevertheless the law until the time of its abandonment,0 and
that the new ruling is to apply only prospectively.7
Attention has been focused primarily upon the hardship which a rigid ad-
herence to the former of these views imposes upon those who have acted on
1. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 1; CAnUozo, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 1, 143; Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern
Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 163; Carpenter, Stare Dccisis and Law Reform
(1927) 1 So. CALiF. REv. 53.
2. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S.
219, 236, 238; Boudin, The Problem of Stare Dccisis in Our Constitutional
History (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 589, 590-591; Shroder, Tle Doctrine of
Stare Decisis-Its Application to Decisions Involving Constitutional Interpre-
tation (1904) 58 CENT. L. J. 23, 24.
3. Cf. Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 409, 414.
4. See Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of Modi-
fled and Overruled Decisions (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 361, 593.
5. This is the so-called declaratory theory of Blackstone. See 1 BL. Com.m
*69-71.
6. This doctrine has been urged especially by AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (5th
ed. 1885) 634, and GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF TE LAW (2d ed. 1921)
222 et seq.
7. There is some confusion as to the meaning of prospcctive and retroqpective
operation. A few writers appear to hold the belief that the former embrace3
the overruling case itself but not other litigation arising during the interval
between the establishment of the precedent and its rejection. The courts, how-
ever, have drawn no such distinction and there appears to be little basis for
it, since the decision of the overruling case is enunciated subsequent to the
occurrence of the operative facts giving rise to that case as well as after the
happening of those inducing the other litigation.
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the strength of precedent. This emphasis has resulted in frequent rejection
of that theory to the extent of excepting from the operation of its rule of
retroaction situations involving the interpretation of statutes or constitutional
provisions in which rights have been acquired under an earlier dissimilar
construction. 8 Support for this position has often been sought in various con-
stitutional doctrines.9 But while the Supreme Court has indicated in diversity
of citizenship cases its disfavor of the retroactive application of an overruling
state decision where retroaction would result in hardship,'o it does not view
the giving of retroactive effect by a state court to an overruling decision as
violative of any federal guarantees. It is now definitely established that the
prohibitions against state action impairing the obligation of contracts 11 and
enforcing ex post facto laws 12 are directed only against the legislative bodies
of the states. And although the due process clause is not thus circumscribed,' 8
such action by a state court is not regarded as within its purview.14
8. A few courts have repudiated outright the doctrine of retroaction. Com-
monwealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 185 Ky. 300, 215 S. W. 42 (1919);
Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421 (1874); Bond Debt Cases, 12 S. C. 200, 282 (1879);
Vermont and Canada Rr. Co. v. Vermont Central Rr. Co., 63 Vt. 1, 21 Atl. 262
(1890). The greater number of courts, however, have achieved the result
sought by indirect means. Of these, some have held that the earlier construction
of a statute, though erroneous, became a part of that statute for the intervening
period, as though written into it. Other courts have made an exception to
the doctrine in instances involving statutes and constitutional provisions, while
outwardly continuing to profess allegiance. See the cases collected in Freeman,
The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Ovemi dng
Decision (1918) 18 CoL. L. Rnv. 230; in Von Moschzisker, supra note 3; Hovon
v. McCarthy Brothers Co., 163 Minn. 339, 204 N. W. 29 (1925); Wilkinson v.
Wallace, 192 N. C. 156, 134 S. E. 401 (1926); State v. Haid, 327 Mo. 667, 38
S. W. (2d) 44 (1931).
Contra are Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 Pac. 213 (1892); Crigler v. Shepler,
79 Kan. 834, 101 Pac. 619 (1909); Stockton v. Dundee Manufacturing Co., 22
N. J. Eq. 56 (1871); Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 38 S. W. 154 (1896); Knee-
land v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454 (1862). And see Fleming v. Fleming,
194 Iowa 71, 184 N. W. 296 (1919-1921), writ of error dismissed, with similar
reasoning, 264 U. S. 29 (1924); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,
323 Mo. 180, 19 S. W. (2d) 746 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U. S. 673
(1930). Of. Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co., 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570
(1913) (lack of good faith in party seeking protection); Hibbits v. Jack;
Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co., both infra note 22.
9. See generally, Freeman, supra note 8. Illustrations in recent cases are
to be found in Fleming v. Fleming, supra note 8; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,
263 U. S. 444 (1924). Cf. State v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924).
10. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863); Douglass v.
County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677 (1879); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, supra note
9. The cases are collected in Jackson v. Harris, 43 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 10th,
1930).
11. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, supra note 9 (authorities collected).
12. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) (authorities collected).
13. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 1U. S. 673, 680
(1930).
14. See Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 112 (1895); Tidal Oil
Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 450 (1924); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
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Recent litigation has for the first time brought before the Supreme Court
the converse of the above situation. In two companion cases the Supreme
Court of Montana 15 had reconsidered the proper interpretation to be placed
upon a state statute1 6 empowering the Board of Railroad Commissioners to
initiate intrastate rates. Under a prior construction 17 shippers could compel
restitution by a carrier upon later proof of the unreasonable or discriminatory
character of the authorized charges. The court was desirous of overruling
this interpretation as irrational and contrary to the established authority
in other jurisdictions,18 but felt that a new ruling should not be permitted
to work to the injury of the contesting shippers and others whose legal be-
havior had presumably been affected by reliance upon the earlier decision.
It therefore declared the previous interpretation erroneous but rendered judg-
ment for the shippers, stating that the altered construction was to be given
only prospective application.'9 The defendant railroad appealed from theze
decisions,20 emphasizing the perverse effect of such a view upon those litigants
who seek the abandonment of precedent. It urged as palpably unfair a phil-
osophy of stare decisis which prompts a court to enter judgment against a
party while acknowledging the correctness of that party's exposition of the
law. Resort was again had to constitutional doctrines for support; the action
of the Montana court in refusing to give retroactive effect to its new dccizion
was said to deny the railroad due process of law. But while the Supreme
Court recognized the novelty of this claim to the protection of the Constitu-
tion, it concluded that the contention was without merit.
In reaching this conclusion the Court entertained the view that no distinction
is to be drawn between the position of the litigant who seeks to have an over-
ruling declaration operate only prospectively and the position of the one who
desires its retroactive application. Consequently, its consistent denial of con-
stitutional protection in the former situation seemed logically to require the
Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680 (1930); Freeman, supra note 8, at 239; McKean,
The Rule of Precedents (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 481, 488; Note (1928) 28
COL. L. REv. 619, 627. Muhlker v. New York and Harlem Rr. Co., 197 U. S.
544 (1905), though appearing to indicate a contrary position, has been dis-
tinguished on the ground that legislative action was involved. Tidal Oil Co.
v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 452 (1924); Freeman, supra note 8, at 237-238.
Nor is the decision in the Brinkerhoff-Faris case, supra, in conflict. Reversal
of the state decision was occasioned by the fact that it had operated to deny
due process "in its primary sense of an opportunity to be heard and to defend
one's substantive right."
15. Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194,
7 P. (2d) 919 (1932); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
91 Mont. 216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932).
16. 1 MONT. REv. CODa (Choate, 1921) § 3794.
17. Doney v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 209, 199 Pac. 432 (1921).
18. See Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 625.
19. Where a court adopts this method of solving the problem, it may be
queried what will later be taken as stare decisis--what the court actually did
in the overruling case or what it there said with reference to future policy.
Cf. Von Moschzisker, supra note 3, at 426; Carpenter, supra note 1, at 58.
20. The carrier challenged the ruling in these decisions by securing a writ
of certiorari in the second of the two. The case reviewed by the Supreme Court
was that of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 53 Sup. Ct.
145 (1932).
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same result in the latter. It may be questioned, however, whether even as
much can be said in support of the position championed by the carrier. Retro-
action, underlain by a highly artificial theory of law,2' imposes a real hardship
through its disregard of the reasonable expectations of the party who has
relied on precedent; whereas prospective operation, while also exacting a kind
of legal martyrdom, does not involve for the party challenging precedent any
corresponding frustration of understanding as to legal status. 22  Moreover,
with retroactive effect, reversals in judicial attitude are necessarily attended
by greater disturbances in the legal system, for they can be secured only at
the cost of creating a state of uncertainty even with respect to the law
obtaining prior to the date of overruling.
In any event, there can be no quarrel. with the Court's adoption of a policy
of non-interference in regard to this whole problem in judicial mechanics. There
exists strong support for the feeling that an individual litigant cannot be heard
to complain if a court, in its effort to rid the law of unsatisfactory precedents,
adopts a theory regarding the operation of overruling decisions which is adverse
to that individual's interests; 23 certainly the injury that may be done is niot
commensurate with the confusion which would undoubtedly follow upon any
attempt on the part of the Federal Court to dictate to state courts its own
doctrine of stare decisis. That Court, in the instant litigation, wisely regarded
the problem as one in judicial discretion rather than in constitutional law and
determined to continue in its policy of leaving the state courts to work out
independently of constitutional exactions, as they are now endeavoring to do,24
their own conceptions of "the binding force of precedent" and "the meaning of
the judicial process."
STATUS OF CERTIFICATE HOLDER ENTITLED TO PERCENTAGE OF RECEIPTS
ATTEMPTS in business financing to secure at the same time the advantages of
one form of investment and the immunities of another have within the past
half dozen years resulted in a variety of more or less mongrel situations which
21. Criticism of the declaratory theory has been quite extensive among legal
writers. See AUSTIN; GRAY, both loc. cit. supra note 6; Lile, Some Views on
the Rule of Stare Decisis (1916) 4 VA. L. REv. 95, 103; Carpenter, Court
Decisions and the Common Law (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 593, 595; Kocourek,
Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal (1931) 17 A. B. A. J.
180. But of. Von Moschzisker, supra note 3, at 413, 430.
22. Where there is no evidence of actual reliance, this generalization would
presumably not be true, and retroaction has at times been permitted in such
situations. Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570 (1884); Nickoll v. Racine Cloak &
Suit Co., 194 Wis. 298, 216 N. W. 502 (1927). Reliance is conclusively pre-
sumed in most cases, however. A distinction could also be drawn in the case
of the litigant seeking the overruling of precedent, between the party who is
frequently involved in similar litigation and thereby possibly compensated,
for the burden thrown upon him by adherence to the rule of prospective opera-
tion, and the individual whose only concern is in the outcome of immediate
litigation.
23. CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 122.
24. Freeman, supra note 8, at 247.
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courts have been reluctant to classify in better known categories.' Such financ-
ing has often taken the form of an issue of certificates by the business enterprise
setting forth various contractual relations thereby created and agreed to
between the firm and the individual investor, and presumed to be beneficial to
the latter.2 Such contractual relations may of course be infinitely varied, and
the judicial process of fitting each litigant who comes before the court in cases
governed by such contracts into one of the few standardized legal norms for
the determination of liability-such as creditor, stockholder, or copartner-
becomes purely Procrustean.3 In the usual case, calling such a certificate holder
a copartner, joint adventurer, or creditor, or stating that he is "like a stoch-
holder," can hardly be taken to mean more than that, in the particular case,
he is to be subjected to liabilities, or granted immunities, as though he were
in such a category.4
Where, for example, the certificate holder is simply to receive a certain per-
centage of the gross receipts of the business, it has been held, in general, that
no liability as a copartner is thereby incurred; 5 whereas a sharing of profits
is in general interpreted prima facie to involve the certificate holder as a joint
enterpriser.6 A share of profits has, however, been interpreted as mere rental,
1. Cases involving "compromise securities" of the sort referred to first
appeared in 1926. See Note (1927) 76 U. op PA. L. REV. 80; Note (1928)
28 CoL. L. Rnv. 65.
2. In addition to the principal case, infra note 11, see cases cited infra notes
9 and 10. A novel form of such certificate financing occurs in Harris Trust
and Savings Bank v. Chicago Rys. Co., 56 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. '7th, 1932).
3. This is usually done through the application of the various tests evolved
in more or less analogous cases. For example, use is made of the proposition
that a preferred stockholder, with whom the certificate holder is closely com-
pared, is not a creditor, Spencer v. Smith; 201 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912);
Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk and Reeves, 8 F. (2d) 71G (C. C. A. 2d,
1925); In re G. L. Miller and Co., 35 F. (2d) 966 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), af'd,
35 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931). But the holder of
a so-called preferred stock certificate may nevertheless be a creditor if the
certificate matures at a fixed date, Best v. Oklahoma Mill Co., 124 Oda. 135,
253 Pac. 1005 (1926). Any measure of control by the certificate holder analo-
gizes his status to that of a stockholder. Additional tests, such as the sharing
of gross receipts or profits, or "holding out" by the parties, are discussed below.
4. Such statements in the opinion of In re Hawkeye Oil Co., infra note 10,
for example-that certificate holders were like stockholders or sleeping part-
ners-could hardly be construed to mean necessarily that a copartnership
relation existed for all purposes.
5. McDonnell v. Battle House Co., 67 Ala. 90 (1880); Beecher v. Bush,
45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785 (1881); Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1872).
See note 6, infra.
6. Miller v. Simpson, 107 Va. 476, 59 S. E. 378 (1907). See extensive anno-
tation, 18 L. R. A. (n.s.) 962, particularly cases cited at 1000. According
to more recent cases, a mere sharing of profits is not sufficient in case it is
shown that the sharing of profits was for certain special purposes, such as
paying a debt, wages, or rent. Hackney Co. v. Robert E. Lee Hotel, infra
note 7. The view of the Uniform Partnership Act is significant as to the
sharing of both gross returns and profits:
YALE LAW JOURNAL
where a hotel rather than money was supplied; 7 and a number of cases have
arisen in which the sharing of gross receipts has been held to involve a for-
feiture of a general creditor's rights, and even, in one case at least, to incur
copartnership liability.8 Thus where a grocery-vending corporation operating
a retail store sold "certificates of ownership" in the store to individuals en-
titling them to distributive shares of a certain percent of the gross receipts,
such certificate holders were held liable to the general creditors of the store for
goods sold to it.9 It has become a common practice to finance gasoline service
stations through the issue of certificates entitling their holders to distributive
shares of a fund created by reserving one cent per gallon from the proceeds of
all gasoline sold until the certificate holders received double the amount paid
for the certificates. The cases arising under this scheme of financing have
involved the order of priority of claims of certificate holders and of general
creditors when the firm became insolvent; and it has been uniformly held that
claims of the general creditors are senior.10
This is essentially the question decided, upon a different fact situation, in
the recent case of In re Lathrap 11 by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit. Here the individual lessee of an oil well sold certificates pur-
porting to assign to the holder of each certificate one percent of the gross
proceeds received from the sale of all oil extracted from the well. The cer-
tificate declared that it created simply a vendor-vendee relationship between
the parties, and that the holder was not a copartner. Upon the bankruptcy
of the lessee the trustee petitioned for an order as to the priority of claims
of the certificate holders to proceeds from the sale of oil. The court found
that the certificate holders were not vendees, nor were they creditors of the
bankrupt, but claimants to the residium of the estate after creditors had
been paid.
While the court compares the status of these certificate holders with that
of creditors, stockholders, preferred stockholders, joint adventurers, and co-
partners, it is careful to identify it with none of them. This appears to be
the most satisfactory analysis of such a situation that has been attempted,
for it is clearly recognized that the liability of the certificate holder may not
be measured by forcing him into any of the better known categories. Ilia
position is not so favorable as that of a "creditor," which disposes of the
only issue raised in the case; but at the same time the court reserves the
right to hold, if it should so desire, that the certificate holder may not be
§ 7 (Rules for Determining the Existence of a Partnership) (3) The
sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership
... (4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business
7. Hackney Co. v. Robert E. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S. W. 1 (1927).
8. See cases cited infra notes 9 and 10.
9. Hartnett Co. v. Shirah, 116 Tex. 154, 287 S. W. 902 (1926).
10. United States and Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas and Oil
Service Co., 19 F. (2d) 624 (W. D. Pa. 1924); In re Hawkeyo Oil Co., 19 F.
(2d) 151 (D. Del. 1927); Massachusetts Gasoline and Oil Co. v. Go-Gas Co.,
259 Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871 (1927). In the last two cases an attempt by
certificate holders to assert a lien upon property of the service station was
denied. In the Hawkeye Oil Co. case, the certificates were secured by a mort-
gage on such property.
11. 61 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
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held liable as a joint adventurer. The speculative nature of the certificate
holder's investment, whereby he may, if and so long as things go well, receive
an abnormally high rate of return, inclines the court to require him to pay
for this advantage by subordinating his claim, when things go ill and there
is a shortage of assets, to claims of general creditors who can in no event
receive more than a fixed contract sum.1 2 If, however, upon the suit of a
creditor, it is sought to hold the certificate holder liable as a joint adventurer,
other considerations may become of controlling importance-such as, for ex-
ample, the "holding out," or "appearances" created by the contracting parties
and upon which third persons must rely as to the ownership and financial
status of the business. 13 Of particular importance among these "appearances"
as to the status of certificate holders is the status which the certificates them-
selves occupy in the financial statement of the business, upon which commercial
agencies, and therefore creditors, must rely.14 For purposes of determining
the tort liability of the certificate holder, upon the same reasoning, still other
factors may become of particular significance.' 5 Clearly this nondescript
investor-enterpriser, in his varying guises, must be dealt with as cui gcncrio
in particular eases in which he appears-with, at most, discreet analogies from
the recognized categories.
RETALIATORY TAXATION OF FOREIGN INSURANCE CORPORATIONS
ALTHOUGH reciprocal and retaliatory statutes applying to the taxation of foreign
insurance corporations have existed for many years in a majority of the states,
the constitutionality of such statutes has not been before the Supreme Court
of the United States since 1886.1 Then in Philadelphia Fire Association
v. New York 2 the Court upheld a New York statute which included provisions
12. In re Lathrap, supra note 11, at 44. Cf. Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association v. Fisher, 61 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
13. Cf. Poillon v. Secor, 61 N. Y. 456 (1875); Standard Oil Co. of New
York v. Henderson, 265 Mlass. 322, 163 N. E. 743 (1928), as to general con-
siderations of "holding out" in eases of contract claims against alleged joint
enterprisers.
14. Cf. Hobbs v. Virginia National Bank, 147 Va. 802, 133 S. E. 595 (192G) ;
Fredericktown Milling Co. v. Rider, 179 Ark. 387, 16 S. W. (2d) 9 (1929);
Eastern Electric Supply Co. v. Ekdahl Brothers, 84 N. H. 339, 150 AUt. 549
(1930), as to "holding out" through financial statements.
15. Cf. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597 (1901);
Jewison v. Dieudonne, 127 Minn. 163, 149 N. W. 20 (1914), as to the general
considerations of "holding out" in tort claims against alleged joint enterprisers.
Of particular interest is Seifert v. Brown, 53 S. W. (2d) 117 (Tx. Civ. App.
1932) where a tort claim arising in connection with the drilling of an oil well
was not allowed against one supplying money for the drilling and operation
of the well for a "consideration of half the profits and an ultimate half interest
in the well.
1. 2 BACON, LIFE AND ACCmENT INSURANCE (4th ed. 1917) § 053; 1 Joycr,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) § 329. The constitutionality of such statutes has,
however, been upheld in numerous decisions of state courts.
2. 119 U. S. 110 (1886).
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for a future increase in the fees of foreign corporations for permission to
engage in business in that state, corresponding with any increase which might
be imposed in the state of origin for licenses for foreign corporations to engage
in business there. The basis of the decision was that until a foreign corporation
had paid the required fee it was not a person within the jurisdiction of New
York, and was consequently not entitled to the benefit of the "equal protection"
clause. There has been no decision by the Supreme Court regarding the con-
stitutionality from the viewpoint of the same clause of retaliatory statutes
imposing franchise taxes on foreign corporations which have already been
granted licenses. But in Hanover Fire Insurance Go. v. Hardng,3 the Supreme
Court made a sharp distinction between the two situations in holding uncon-
stitutional an Illinois statute which assessed the personal property taxes of
foreign insurance corporations on a higher basis than those of domestic cor-
porations. It declared that when a corporation had become entitled to the
privilege of doing business within a state it thereby acquired the benefit of
the "equal protection" clause to the extent that no taxes may thereafter be
imposed which do not fall with equal weight on all corporations of the same
class, domestic and foreign.4 This language may constitute a warning.5
It has been frequently stated that retaliatory statutes being penal in character
should whenever -possible receive a construction in favor of the taxpayer.0
The contrary construction was, however, recently placed on an Illinois statute
which provides that if the state of origin of an insurance company licensed in
Illinois should impose on foreign corporations engaged in business in that
state a higher tax than the usual Illinois privilege tax on foreign corporations,
the corporations of that state should pay in Illinois privilege taxes in accord-
ance with the statutes of the state of their origin.7  The Illinois rate is 2%
annually on gross premiums from contracts covering risks within Illinois, less
deductions for premiums paid for reinsurance and for dividends to policy
holders.8  The Ohio rate is 2-1/2%, less deductions for premiums received for
reinsurance; 9 no deduction being allowed for dividends to policy holders. A
tax had been imposed on an Ohio corporation which had paid substantial
premiums for reinsurance of its Illinois contracts, on the basis of the Ohio
rate and the Ohio deduction scheme. Consequently, no deduction had been
allowed for the reinsurance premiums. These premiums had been paid to
corporations subject to taxation in Illinois for all reinsurance on risks within
the state. The corporation argued that there was thus created a double tax
as to those risks which it had elected to reinsure, a result which should have
been avoided by the calculation of the tax in accordance with the Ohio rate,
but with the allowances for deductions granted by the Illinois statute. The
court, however, declaring that reinsurance contracts are distinct from primary
3. 272 U. S. 494 (1926). Note (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 777,
4. 272 U. S. 494, 510, 515 (1926).
5. In State v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co., 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858 (1931),
an Alabama retaliatory statute was held unconstitutional in reliance upon
Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926). Note (1931)
45 HARV. L. REv. 184; Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 433. Cf. Power Manu-
facturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927).
6. See note 1, supra. Cf. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Boys, 296 11.
166, 129 N. E. 724 (1920).
7. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 73, § 68.
8. Id. § 67.
9. OHio GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 5433.
contracts,' 0 and as such separately taxable, concluded that since the Ohio rate
was higher than the Illinois rate, it was mandatory to apply in addition the
-Ohio deduction scheme.' 1
This construction of the Illinois statute would permit foreign corporations
making a practice of reinsuring their Illinois risks and having their origin in
states which, like Illinois, allow a deduction for premiums paid for this rein-
surance to obtain lower taxes than corporations whose state of origin does not
grant a similar deduction. And corporations any portion of whose Illinois
business constitutes reinsurance and whose state of origin, like Ohio, permits a
deduction for premiums 'eceived for carrying reinsurance, would obtain a
lower rate than the corporations of states which do not allow similar deductions.
In either instance the assessment of the tax would be based not only on a higher
rate obtaining in a foreign state, but also on the allocation of the business of
a particular company between direct insurance and reinsurance, and upon
allowances for deductions based on policies possibly purely local to the foreign
state.12 Moreover, it is by no means certain that Ohio would apply its own
retaliatory statute 13 to Illinois corporations writing reinsurance there by
employing the Illinois deduction scheme in order to arrive at a higher tax than
-would result from a computation based on the statutes applicable to all foreign
corporations.14  On the contrary, the courts of most states have manifested a
tendency to approve taxes based upon whichever deduction scheme would produce
for the particular litigant the tax least in excess of the basic rate applicable to
foreign corporations doing business in that state.1 5
The court's approval of a tax based on the Ohio rate and the Ohio deduction
scheme in the instant case would appear to arrive at a result contrary to the
legislative intent of both Illinois and Ohio. Both deduction schemes are ob-
viously framed to avoid the burden of a double tax on reinsurance written
within those states.16 And inasmuch as the only essential divergence between
the privilege taxes of Ohio and Illinois is the difference in rate, the court, by
superimposing the Illinois deductions upon the Ohio rate could have effectuated
this legislative purpose, and at the same time have fully complied with the
terms of the retaliatory statute.
10. Cf. Vial v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Soc., 257 Ill. 355, 100 N. E.
929 (1913), and Baltica Insurance Co. v. Carr, 330 Ill. 608, 162 N. E. 178 (1928),
cited by the court.
11. Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Lowe, 349 Ill. 464, 182 N. E. .611
(1932).
12. The decision would also appear to permit Ohio corporations whose
entire Illinois business consists of reinsurance to operate in Illinois without
payment of an Illinois tax.
13. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 5436.
14. Id. §§ 5432, 5433.
15. Cochrane v. Bankers Life Co., 30 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
State v. American Insurance Co., 79 Ind. App. 88, 137 N. E. 338 (1922);
Bankers Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 218 Pac. 586 (1923); Life &
Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S. W. (2d)
748 (1930); Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135,
296 Pac. 813 (1931). Of course, the general rate applicable to foreign cor-
porations is the minimum which will be applied.
16. Many other differences appear in the statutes of the various states
respecting deductions: for example, as to deduction of losses, time for payment,
credit for other types of tax. See cases cited in note 15, supra.
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INTEREST IN INSURANCE PROCEEDS OF MORTGAGOR REPAIRING PROPERTY
THE New York standard fire insurance policy stipulates that the insurance
company may, in lieu of payment, repair damaged property within a reasonable
time, provided notice of its intention be given within thirty days after proof
of loss. The standard mortgagee clause declares that loss under the policy
shall be payable to the mortgagee as his interest may appear, and that the
mortgagee's interest in the insurance shall not be invalidated by any act of
the mortgagor. In Savarese v. Ohio Farmers' Insurance Company 1 the New
York Court of Appeals held that under a policy containing these provisions a
mortgagor who repaired damaged property without the consent of either the
insurance company or the mortgagee was not entitled to the insurance pro-
ceeds as against the mortgagee, where the repairs were completed before the
expiration of the period within which the insurance company itself might have
elected to repair.2 The court further held that the mortgagee's recovery was
limited by the eighty per cent clause, which provides that the insurance com-
pany shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the sum
insured bears to eighty per cent of the cash value of the property at the time
of the loss.3
Where a mortgagee separately insures his interest in the mortgaged property,
upon payment of a loss to the mortgagee the insurance company becomes sub-
rogated to an equivalent part of the mortgage debt. 4 But where the mortgagor
and mortgagee are insured by the same policy, payment of a loss to the mort-
gagee discharges the mortgage debt pro tanto.5 It is of no consequence that
the mortgage security remains ample after loss to secure the mortgage debt;
the security is reduced and hence the mortgagee is entitled to the insurance
proceeds according to his contract with the insurer. If when payment of a
loss is made to the mortgagee the mortgage debt is not yet due, the mortgagee
may benefit from the loss. 6 And it might be argued that the mortgagee is still
entitled to interest on the entire debt until maturity, unless the mortgage pro-
vided for earlier payment at the mortgagor's option. In the principal case
the court permits a mortgagee to reap an even greater benefit from a "loss."
If in the exercise of its option to repair, the insurance company, rather than
the mortgagor, had rebuilt the property, the mortgagee could not have re-
covered. While payment of the insurance to the mortgagee, of course, discharges
the mortgage debt pro tanto, the mortgagee has the same security for the
remainder of the debt that he formerly had for the entire obligation. The
decision is consequently at some variance with the established doctrine that a
contract for the insurance of property is a contract of indemnity only.7 How-
ever, it may be urged that the option to repair given the insurance company
1. 182 N. E. 665 (N. Y. 1932).
2. Judges Lehman and O'Brien dissented.
3. Hubbs, J., dissented on the ground that the mortgagee was entitled to
the full amount of the loss.
4. Foster v. Van Reed, 70 N. Y. 19 (1877).
5. Waring v. Loder, 53 N. Y. 581 (1873).
6. But if the value of the mortgaged property before loss was only equal to
the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may ultimately suffer loss to the extent that
the value of the property destroyed exceeds the amount of the insurance pro-
ceeds.
7. See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 30.
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under the policy excludes a similar option of the mortgagor.8 Further, the
court in the principal case called attention to Section 254 of the New York
Real Property Law, subdivision 4,9 which provides that a mortgagee at his
election may apply insurance proceeds toward the payment of the mortgage
or may pay them over to the mortgagor, for the repair of damaged buildings,
and reasoned that this provision excluded a similar choice of the mortgagor.
But it is arguable that if the provision is construed to be applicable prior to
the expiration of the period within which, under the policy, the insurance
company might elect to repair, then even the insurance company's option to
repair is rendered nugatory. A counter argument would be that even though
the statute is absolute in its terms, it may reasonably be construed to give
the mortgagee a choice only as against the mortgagor, and not as against the
insurer.
It must be noted, however, though the court makes no mention of the fact,
that the statute is only applicable to insurance proceeds "received" by the
mortgagee, and if literally construed merely affirms the mortgagee's rights
-without the statute; hence the provision would not seem to be relevant in
-determining to whom the insurance proceeds should be paid. If the statute be
construed to enlarge the mortgagee's rights, an interesting question arises as to
the legal relations of the parties where a mortgagee wishes to turn over in-
surance proceeds to the mortgagor for repairs but the mortgagor is unwilling to
repair.
The most substantial premise for the mortgagee's position in the principal
case is that the repairing of the damaged property by the mortgagor is an4 'act" of the mortgagor, which, under the standard mortgagee clause, cannot
invalidate the mortgagee's interest in the insurance. On the other hand, it
may be contended that the mortgagee could not possibly have a right of action
against the insurance company until the expiration of the period within which
the company might elect to repair, that until then the mortgagee's interest in
the insurance proceeds -was not to be determined, and that at the expiration of
this period in the principal case no loss to the mortgagee appearedlo A narrow
question of construction of the mortgagee clause is thus presented.
If a right of action once vests in the mortgagee, it seems clearly unreasonable
to permit the right to be divested by the mortgagor by repairing the property
at any time before suit is brought.1 1 And if the repairs are only partially
completed by the mortgagor at the expiration of the period within which the
insurance company might elect to repair, it would seem that as a matter of
-onvenience the mortgagee should be held entitled to the entire amount of the
insurance. 2 But in the situation presented by the principal case the awarding
of the insurance proceeds to the mortgagee will have the unfortunate effect
of requiring mortgagors separately to insure their interests in order to assure
8. Obviously, if the mortgagor repaired the property the insurer could
mot exercise its option to repair. Moreover, the doctrine of czpressio unito eut
exclusio alterius seems applicable.
9. N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (1930) c. 51, § 254 (4).
10. See dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., at 670.
11. Foster v. Equitable Mutual Insurance, 68 Mass. 216 (1854). But see
In re Moore, 6 Daly 541 (N. Y. 1876); and cf. Huey v. Ewell, 22 Tex. Civ.
App. 638, 55 S. W. 606 (1900); Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of North America,
197 Wis. 136, 221 N. W. 654 (1928).




themselves of funds with which to repair damaged property.'8 However, therer
is the equally practical objection in favor of the mortgagee that the awarding
of the insurance proceeds to the mortgagor would often compel the mortgagee
to litigate the sufficiency of the repairs.14 Mortgagees, often far away from
the mortgaged property, could not be expected to supervise the mortgagor's
activities.
The standard coinsurance clause provides that the insurance company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the sum insured bears to.
the total insurance on the property. But since under the standard mortgagee
clause no act of the mortgagor can invalidate the mortgagee's interest in the
insurance, the procurement of additional insurance by the mortgagor for his
separate benefit does not operate to diminish recovery by the mortgagee. 15 Nor
is the mortgagee's recovery diminished where the mortgagor without the knowl-
edge of the mortgagee has additional insurance on the property at the time the
mortgagee's interest is insured.16 In the principal case the mortgagee claimed
the full amount of the loss on the ground that the eighty per cent clause, like
the coinsurance clause, was inapplicable to mortgagees by reason of the standard
mortgagee clause. He argued that if the provision affected mortgagees, a
mortgagor, by making improvements on the mortgaged property before lost,
would thereby diminish the mortgagee's interest in the insurance, since under
the eighty per cent clause the extent of recovery is diminished by an increase
in the value of the property before loss. But it seems improbable that the
parties to the contract ever contemplated that the insurance company should
be liable for the full amount of a loss. Moreover, a mortgagee, who normally
rejoices before loss when the mortgagor makes improvements on the mortgaged
property, should not be heard to complain of the same improvements after loss.
And the ostensible purpose of the eighty per cent clause, namely, to discourage
negligence and incendiarism by making the insured bear a portion of the loss,
relates to the mortgagee as well as to the mortgagor. Hence the court's re-
jection of the mortgagee's argument seems correct.
17
13. Proof of loss under the policy must be made within sixty days after
the fire, unless the insurance company agrees in writing to a longer period.
Thereafter the company has thirty days in which to elect to repair. Hence,
had the court reached a contrary result, mortgagors would have had ninety
days within which to repair damaged property and thereby entitle themselves
to the insurance proceeds.
14. This objection would seem even more substantial if the mortgagor were
allowed recovery pro tanto for partial repairs.
15. Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307 (1894).
But doubtless the mortgagee's recovery would be diminished where the mortgagee,
either separately or in conjunction with the mortgagor, procured additional
insurance on his own interest.
16. Hastings v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 73 N. Y. 141 (1878). C.
Goldstein v. National Liberty Insurance Co., 256 N. Y. 26, 175 N. E. 359 (1931).
17. The same result was reached in Hartwig v. American Insurance Co., 169
App. Div. 60, 154 N. Y. Supp. 801 (2d Dep't 1915) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Aachen
and Munich Fire Insurance Co., 257 Fed. 189 (D. Pa. 1919).
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REALIZATION OF TAXABLE INCOME BY CORPORATION'S PURCHASE OF
ITS OWN DIVIDEND BONDS
IN 1914 the taxpayer, a New York corporation, approved an appraisal of its
assets which added $3,000,000 to its surplus account. Against this surplus the
corporation issued a $2,000,000 bond dividend. In 1926 and 1927 some of the
uiunatured bonds were purchased by the corporation at less than their face
value. These bonds were cancelled, and the difference between the purchase
price and the face value was credited to surplus. The Board of Tax Appeals
ruled that the amount of this difference did not constitute taxable income to
the corporation, and on appeal its decision was affirmed.'
In the principal case the corporation by purchasing some of its bonds at
less than their face value decreased its liabilities by the amount of the par
value of the bonds purchased, decreased its assets by the amount of the cash
paid for the bonds, and increased its surplus by the amount of the difference
between the two.2 In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.3 a corporation issued
its bonds in return for their face value in cash and later in the same year
repurchased some of them at less than their face value. The Supreme Court
held that the amount of the difference constituted income. The court in the
principal case distinguished the Kirby case on the ground that the bonds here
involved were not issued in return for cash, but merely as a method of dis-
tributing surplus. But regardless of the purpose for which the bonds weie
issued, it would seem that by purchasing some of them at less than their face
value the corporation did realize an actual gain, since assets in the amount of
the purchase discount were released to the general uses of the taxpayer. Assets
minus liabilities equal proprietorship, and it would seem to be immaterial to
a solvent corporation whether proprietorship is increased by an increase in
assets, as a result of an operating profit, or by a decrease in liabilities, as a
result of the liquidation of a valid obligation at less than its face value.
The court in the principal case distinguished decisions involving the ad-
justment of tax returns for former years on the ground that here the obligation
evidenced by the bonds had never been an expense item deductible from gross
income. But in Western Maryland Ry. v. Commissioncr4 a corporation that
sold its bonds at a discount was held entitled to deduct each year from its
gross income as interest the actual amount paid the bondholders plus an aliquot
portion of the discount prorated over the life of the bonds.5  Hence if a
corporation repurchases at a discount bonds issued for their face value in cash,
it is evident that each year prior to the repurchase the corporation has deducted
as interest the full amount paid the bondholders, whereas it should only be
allowed to deduct that amount minus an aliquot portion of the discount at
which the bonds were repurchased.6 Rather than disturb old tax returns, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has chosen to regard the repurchase dis-
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F. (2d) 751
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals is reported in
22 B. T. A. 1277 (1931).
2. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 960, 962 and n. 12.
3. 284 U. S. 1, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
4. 33 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
5. This method of amortization, of course, is not strictly accurate, but
generally has been adopted for the sake of simplicity. HATFIEm, ACCOUNTING
(1928) 230.
6. See Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 280, 283.
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count as income.7 Accordingly, although the obligation evidenced by the bonds
in the principal case was never an expense item deductible from gross income,
it would seem that inquiry should be made as to whether the corporation, during
the years the bonds were outstanding, had deducted interest payments on the
bonds as an expense. If interest payments were so deducted, unquestionably
the purchase discount should be regarded as income to the extent of tho prior
deductions.8
THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY CASE-SOME
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
THE directors of the American Tobacco Company, a New Jersey corporation
doing a world-wide trade, with its "principal place of business" in Now York
city, advised the stockholders to ratify a general plan whereby 56,712 shares
would be allotted to deserving employees in accordance with recommendations
made by the president. Having obtained more than the two-thirds assent re-
quired by the New Jersey statute under which they purported to act, 1 the
allotments were made, and the president received 13,440 shares by transfer in
trust, at a par value of $25. The market price was then $116. The plaintiff,
a minority stockholder residing in New York, brought suit to enjoin the dis-
tribution to officers and subsequently the suit was removed to the Federal court
for the Southern district of New York. The Supreme Court, three justices
dissenting, and one not voting, decided that the district court could not take
jurisdiction of the suit, since it involved the regulation of the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation and depended for its settlement upon the effect to be
given to statutes of the state of incorporation. 2 The Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which had decided in favor of the company
on the merits,3 and reinstated the original judgment dismissing the suit with-
out prejudice.4
The merits of this particular employee stock participation plan have been
previously discussed in this Journal. 5 It was assumed that if the Court dis-
approved of the transaction in substance, no untoward exercise of discretion
would be involved by taking jurisdiction. Certainly, Mr. Justice Stone saw no
jurisdictional difficulties, and in a vigorous dissent condemned the failure of
the company's officers to disclose previous bonuses and credits to themselves,
and the vagueness of the plan which concealed the now evident self-interest of
the executives. 6
The jurisdictional issues cannot be determined by the exercise of logic, The
old rule which gave local protection to the stockholder in a foreign corporation
7. U. S. TREAS. REG. 74, Art. 68 (1929).
8. For a fuller discussion of the treatment of bond premiums and bond dis-
counts for income tax purposes see Comments, supra notes 2 and 6.
1. N. J. STAT. (1920) c. 175, § 1.
2. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 295 (U. S. 1933) per Butler,
J.; Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, JJ. dissenting. Roberts, J. took no part in
the case.
3./ 60 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) per Manton, J. Judge Swan dis-
senting.
4. 60 F. (2d) 106 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
5. Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 419.
6. 53 Sup. Ct. at 299, 304.
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as to his individual rights, but denied the local remedies for invasions of his
rights as a stockholder, 7 is based upon a fictitious distinction. It was perhaps
sufficient for times when a corporation transacted most of its business in the
state of incorporation. But now it is admittedly the "inability of the court
to do complete justice by its decree and not its incompetency to decide the
questions involved that determines the exercise of its power." 8 If the court
can do no more than to make the matter res adjudicata for necessary enforce-
ment by another court, it may as well refuse jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration.9 On the other hand, where all the parties are before the court, where
at least some business is done in the district of the local tribunal, and where
the particular transaction occurred, in part at least, in the district of the local
court, it is difficult to perceive what is lacking to make the decrees of the
court effective.' 0  Furthermore, if the requested relief is concerned vith spe-
cific acts that, unlike receiverships, do not require the local court to examine
the entire business of the foreign corporation, or to assume custody of all
its assets, then jurisdiction may well be assumed."' In the instant case, all
parties are before the court; the company's principal place of business, books
and records, all are in New York; several of its officers are New York citizens;
7. North State Copper Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 AtI. 1039 (1885).
8. Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 (1927); American Creosote
Works v. Powell, 298 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924); Williamson v. Missouri
Kansas Pipe Line Co., 56 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Fudeckar v.
Louisiana Loan & Investment Co., 13 F. (2d) 921 (D. La. 1926); Backus v.
Finkelstein, 23 F. (2d) 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14,
91 N. E. 683 (1910); Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259, 109 N. E.
250 (1915).
9. Kimball v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N. E. 697 (1892),
per Holmes J.; Sauerbunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 3G3, 115 N. E.
1001 (1917).
10. These elements were present in cases cited supra note 8, but, com-
pletely or in part, were absent where the court has refused jurisdiction. See,
for example, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Newman, 187 Fed. 573 (C. C. A.
7th, 1911) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 75 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 568 (1910) ; 8 THoIP-
soN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 6697-6699.
11. This factor is decisive in receivership or dissolution cases. Republican
Silver Mines v. Brown, 58 Fed. 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); Parks v. U. S. Bankers
Corp., 140 Fed. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1905); Pierce v. Sutherland, 164 Fed. 609
(C. C. A. 9th, 1908); Maguire v. Mortgage Co., 203 Fed. 858 (C. C. A. 7th,
1913); and legitimacy of corporation: Wallace v. Motor Products Co., 25 F.
(2d) 655 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Hogue v. American Steel Foundries, 247 Pa.
12, 92 AtI. 1073 (1915); Wason v. Buzzell, 181 Mass. 338, 63 N. E. 909 (1902).
Or going to whole activity of foreign corporation or organic act, Eberhard v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 210 Fed. 520 (E. D. Ohio 1914);
North State Copper Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 AUt. 1039 (1835); Kimball
v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N. E. 697 (1892); Sauerbrunn v.
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 363, 115 N. E. 1001 (1917); Cohn v. Mishhoff-
Costiow Co., 256 N. Y. 102, 175 N. E. 529 (1931). Or the relief requested is
very broad, requiring full investigation; Leary v. Columbia River & P. S.
Navigation Co., 82 Fed. 275 (N. D. Wash. 1895); Sidway v. Missouri Land
etc. Co., 101 Fed. 481 (C. C. Mo. 1900); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Newman,
187 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911); cf. American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290
Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
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the plan involved the active cooperation of the New York Guaranty Trust
Company; and the complaint bears no relation to the entire business of the
company.
12
The further objections of the majority to deciding the effect of a state statute
appear to be more dilatory than substantial, since the probable result of the
dismissal, if the plaintiff continues, will be to bring the case again before the
federal judiciary by way of the federal Court for the District of New Jersey.1 3
But the conduct of the directors of the American Tobacco Company in the
instant case can be attacked apart from any consideration of the New Jersey
statute -unless it is said that a statute may condone a fraud. The separation
of ownership from control 14 demands that complete information be given to
scattered stockholders on the occasions when they must make a decision on
policy. In dealing with a corporation engaged in a world-wide business, the
New York court is clearly able to enjoin benefits to corporate officers, as un-
reasonable compensation, or because of the secretive methods employed to secure
the stockholders' ratification. Although the decision leaves the legal status of
the plan undecided, the president of the American Tobacco Company has an-
nounced that he has given up his shares of the stock, and further suit may
be unlikely.15
ALLOWANCE OF COSTS RECOVERED IN ACTION AGAINST INSOLVENT BANIC
THE plaintiff filed his claim for the credit balance of his account with the
superintendent of banks, liquidator of the Bank of the United States. Upon
rejection of his claim, he sued the bank for his balance, The bank set up a
counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff was indebted to it as indorser on two
notes. The lower court sustained the bank's counterclaim and granted judg-
ment to the plaintiff for the difference between his deposit balance and the
defendant's counterclaim, together with costs. Liquidation dividends were
paid to the plaintiff on the amount of his judgment, exclusive of costs, and
the question on appeal was whether he was entitled to payment of costs in
full or merely to regular liquidation dividends thereon. The New York Ap-
pellate Division held that the plaintiff was entitled to full payment of the
costs awarded to him.1
In the only other case found presenting substantially the same problem in-
volved in the instant case, it was held that a judgment for costs in a claim
contested by the liquidator of a bank should be paid in full. 2 Costs recovered
12. There was a prior successful suit in the New York state court by plain-
tiffs' stockholder to obtain examination of books. Rogers v. American Tobacco
Company, 143 Misc. 306, 257 N. Y. Supp. 321, aff'd, 233 App. Div. 708, 249
N. Y. Supp. 993 (1st Dep't 1927). For other data, see dissent, Stone J., supra
at p. 303, and Record on Appeal.
13. Dissent, Stone J. at 304.
14. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932) cited by Mr. Justice Stone. See also, VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHII'
(1923).
15. N. Y. Times, February 11, 1933, p. 21, 25.
1. Ostertag v. Broderick, 260 N. Y. Supp. 866 (1st Dep't 1932).
2. In re Carnegie Trust Co., 161 App. Div. 280, 146 N. Y. Supp. 809 (1st
Dep't 1914).
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against a receiver,3 or an administrator or executor of a deceased,4 are held
entitled to priority of payment over claims of general creditors of the estate,
and the same rule probably applies to situations involving the recovery of costs
against trustees in bankruptcy and assignees for the benefit of creditors, al-
though no authority for this proposition has been found.5 The application of
these analogies, however, would be considerably restricted if the argument of
the dissent 6 in the instant case were adopted: that the bank, and not the
liquidator, was the defendant in the suit by the depositor for his balance, and
that the recovery of costs by the plaintiff resulted in a debt of the bank which
is payable by the superintendent along with the claims of other general creditors.
The cases involving the recovery of costs against a receiver 7 or the personal
representative of a deceased 8 were thus distinguished on the ground that they
are the only parties who may sue or be sued, whereas a superintendent of
banks is merely a liquidating custodian not having such powers. The dissent
concluded, therefore, that the judgment should not be divided, since "It con-
stitutes, after all, but one indebtedness." 9 The application of this reasoning
to a situation involving litigation of a small claim, however, may well be
questioned, since a pro rata allowance for costs might result in the expenditure
by the claimant of more than the actual amount of the recovered claim. And
although it may be argued that payment of full costs would be prejudicial to
the general creditors of the insolvent, there is no valid reason why the fund
to which the creditors are entitled should not be subjected to payment in full
of the costs of opposing a successful claim, especially where the claim was
rejected in the first instance for the benefit of all the creditors.
3. Columbian Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 37 N. Y. 536 (1868) (costs recovered
against receiver by successful defendant); Locke v. Covert, 42 Hun 484 (N. Y.
1886) (costs recovered against receiver by successful plaintiff).
4. Shields v. Sullivan, 3 Dem. Rep. 296 (N. Y. 1885) (costs recovered against
administrator by successful plaintiff); In re Casey's Estate, 6 N. Y. Supp. 608
(3d Dep't 1889) (costs recovered against executor by successful defendant);
In re Randell's Estate, 2 Con. 29, 8 N. Y. Supp. 652 (Sur. Ct. 1889) (costs
recovered against executrix by successful plaintiff); Matter of Mahoney, 37
Misc. 472, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (Sur. Ct. 1902) (costs recovered against ad-
ministratrix by successful defendant); In re Friedlander's Estate, 160 App.
Div. 475, 145 N. Y. Supp. 679 (1st Dep't 1914) (costs recovered against execu-
tor by successful defendant). In Shute v. Shute, 5 Dem. Rep. 1 (N. Y. 1886),
it was held that a judgment for costs recovered against the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased are not entitled to priority over the general creditors of
the estate. This decision, however, was expressly overruled in In re Randell's
Estate, supra.
5. In In re Carnegie Trust Co., supra note 2, the court said: "It is well
settled that costs against executors, administrators, assignees for the benefit
of creditors and receivers are payable out of the estate and have priority over
the claims of general creditors." None of the cases cited for this proposition
-applied to situations involving assignees for the benefit of creditors, and no
authority, other than this dictum, has been found.
6. Two judges dissented.
7. See note 3, supra.
8. See note 4, supra.
9. Ostertag v. Broderick, supra note 1, at 870.
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LIABILITY OF BANK FOR DIvERsIoN BY AGENT OF CORPORATION
A, who was president of both the plaintiff and the X corporation, was empowered
to draw on the checking account which the X corporation carried with the
defendant bank. He deposited to the credit of the X corporation a check
payable to the plaintiff corporation and endorsed in blank by A and his son.
The son, who held no position in the plaintiff corporation, had been persuaded
to countersign falsely as secretary. Subsequently, A diverted the proceeds to
his own use. The jury found that A had no authority to endorse without
restriction, but that the bank was not put on notice.1 Nevertheless, the bank
was held liable in conversion. 2 By tbis decision, the New York Court of Appeals
reaffirms its belief that checks payable to a corporation are normally deposited
in the account of the payee corporation, that payments by check of corpora-
tion debts are normally made with checks drawn on its own account and that
a departure from this practice should put takers upon notice. The opinion,
however, is phrased in terms of agency and ignored the conflict in the jury
findings. The Court of Appeals accepted the first finding and shaped it to
conform with its own belief that customary business practice did not give A
actual authority as president to deposit in his own account, a check payable to
the corporation. It further stated that the signature of A's son precluded
reliance upon apparent authority in A alone.4
The established rules of agency supply the outline for the opinion. A prin-
cipal is-not liable for an unauthorized issue of a negotiable instrument, where
1. "Do you find from the evidence that the defendant bank was required in
this particular transaction to make inquiries with respect to the indorsement
appearing on said check." To this the jury answered: "No." Record of case
on appeal, p. 18. It is not clear that the question is one of fact, properly put
to the jury.
2. Wen Kroy Realty Co. v. Public National Bank, 260 N. Y. 84, 183 N. E.
73 (1932). A demurrer was sustained to the original complaint which went
on the theory that the bank was liable because it knew the president could
draw on the account of X corporation. Same, N. Y. L. J. April 27, 1928. At
trial on the amended complaint, the trial court ruled for the bank, but the
appellate division reversed. 234 App. Div. 461, 255 N. Y. Supp. I (1st Dep't
1932).
3. In the following cases the bank was held for accepting such a check for
deposit to the account of the agent. Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Bank, 228
N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347 (1920); Schmidt v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 64 Hun 298,
19 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1st Dep't 1892), aff'd, 138 N. Y. 631, 33 N. E. 1084; Bur-
stein v. People's Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1092 (2d Dep't
1911); Moch v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1st
Dep't 1917) ; Niagara Woolen Co. v. Pacific Bank, 141 App. Div. 265, 126 N. Y.
Supp. 890 (1st Dep't 1910) (check deposited in account over which the agent
had drawing power); S. S. Specialty Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, 220 N. Y.
478, 116 N. E. 386 (1917) (check restrictively indorsed deposited in third
person's account): In other jurisdictions: Palo Alto Mutual Bldg. Ass'n v.
Bank, 33 Cal. App. 214, 164 Pac. 1f24 (1917) ; Bank v. Thrower, 118 Ga. 433, 45
S. E. 316 (1903); Dennis Metal Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity U. T. Co., 99 N. J. Law
365, 123 Atl. 614 (1923); Underwood v. Bank of Liverpool [1924] 1 K. B. 775.
4. See Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 516: "It is difficult to regard the
representation of the non-existent agency of the son as notice of the father's
actual lack of authority." But see infra.
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any substantial departure by the agent from the ordinary methods of con-
ducting business is sufficient warning of lack of authorization, actual or ap-
parent.5 The New York courts, however, have refrained from imposing harsh
and impracticable burdens upon bankers.0 There is, of course, no reason why
the bank should not be held, where it appears from the face of a negotiable
instrument, which the bank takes in satisfaction of its claim against the agent,
that the instrument belongs to the principal.7 Where, however, the bank is not
a creditor but merely accepts a check for deposit, the transaction itself must
give the bank clear notice not only that the instrument belongs to the principal
but also that the proceeds have been or will be diverted to satisfy personal
debts of the agent.8 Accordingly, a bank is not liable where the corporation's
agent deposits in his own account a check drawn to his own order upon cor-
porate funds, for it is likely that a corporation would discharge a debt due the
agent by check.9 Nor is it liable where an executor deposits in his personal
account a check drawn on or payable to the trust estate.10 Such a transaction
gives notice that the proceeds belong to the trust estate, but executors may pay
trust debts by personal checks. A second transaction in which the executor uses
the proceeds of such deposits to pay a personal obligation to the bank is necessary
before the bank can be said to have notice of the conversion.11 But the trans-
action in the instant case was in itself considered sufficiently inconsistent with
the usual business practice to put the bank on notice. 12 So confirmed is the
5. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (1865); Restatement
of Agency, §§ 390, 397 (A. L. I. Tentative Draft, 1929).
6. At least in contrast to the Federal courts of the second circuit, the New
York courts have been lenient. Compare Havana Rr. Co. v. Knickerbocker
Trust Co., 198 N. Y. 422, 92 N. E. 12 (1910) with Havana Rr. Co. v. Central
Trust Co., 204 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); and Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co.,
234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923) with Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., 9 F. (2d)
713 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), rev'd, 274 U. S. 473 (1927).
7. Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N. Y. 61, 84 N. E. 585 (1908). The bank:
is in no better position than a private individual. Gerard v. McCormick, 130
N. Y. 261, 29 N. E. 115 (1891). 1
8. By building up an account with transfers from the principal's funds, the
agent obviously can satisfy his private debts by issuing checks which give no
indication that the funds belong to the principal.
9. Havana Rr. Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., supra note 6. There is a
Massachusetts decision holding that as to such a check, not deposited with a
bank, but given in payment of a private debt of the agent, the taker is not put
on notice. Fillebrown v. Hayward, 190 Mlass. 472, 77 N. E. 45 (1906). But in
Schmitt v. Potter Title Trust Co., 61 Pa. Sup. Ct. 301 (1915), and Bank v.
Gillette, 52 Old. 341, 152 Pac. 1084 (1915), the bank was held where the checks
were drawn payable to the agent. In Rochester Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281,
58 N. E. 114 (1900), the personal creditor was held liable for conversion where
he took a check drawn by the agent payable to the creditor.
10. Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., supra note 6.
11. Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1910).
12. The New York Court has suggested that even if the agent had authority
to endorse generally so that his signature would be valid under § 42 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law still it might be that the form of the check in-
dicated a method of doing business so "far out of harmony with the custom of
corporations" as to warn the defendant. S. S. Specialty Co. v. Corn Exchange
Bank, supra note 2.
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New York court in its belief that a corporation normally deposits in its own
account checks of which it is the payee that where the check is restrictively
endorsed by rubber stamp, a deposit in any other account will put the bankc
on notice.18 It is not necessary, as in the instant case, that it be an account
over which the agent has drawing power. And it has been held that a similar
fixed usage with respect to checks prevails among unincorporated enterprises.
14
If it be true that there is a single prevailing channel for checks payable
to a corporation, then the result reached in the instant case is justified by
policy.'5 Since notice of the diversion by the agent was apparent from the
transaction, and especially from the face of the check, the imposition of liability
upon the bank was necessary to establish even a minimum standard of care in
preventing such diversions. A departure from a rigid norm is a gross depart-
ure. The norm is geared to ordinary honesty and a gross irregularity warns
of dishonesty.'( Perhaps checks payable to a corporation do not follow as
straight a course as the instant case suggests, but it is useless to direct attention
to anything save the validity of the belief that they do. At least, no amount
of discussion of actual and apparent authority and no analogies to executors
and trustees will disprove that belief.17
REIMBURSEMENT BY REmOTE GRANTEE OF ORIGINAL GRANTOR-MORTGAGOR
FOR PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT
IN Harvey v. Lowry 1 the plaintiff, a judgment debtor, sold his interest in
certain land which was incumbered by a judgment lien, the grantee buying
subject to the incumbrance but making no contract to pay the judgment debt.
The grantee sold his interest to a second grantee under the same conditions.
Thereupon execution was levied on the land, and it was sold to the judgment
creditor for an amount less than that required to satisfy the claim. The
second grantee sold his equity of redemption to a third grantee, the defendant
in the principal case, who contracted as part of the purchase price to satisfy
the judgment debt in full. The defendant redeemed the land, and, -without
further payment, obtained from the judgment creditor a release of all claims
13. S. S. Specialty Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, supra note 2. But of. Salon
v. Bank, 110 App. Div. 636, 97 N. Y. Supp. 361 (1st Dep't 1906); Cluett v.
Couture, 140 App. Div. 830, 125 N. Y. Supp. 813 (3d Dep't 1910) (bank not
liable where the blank indorsement was in writing). See Note L. R. A. 1918B,
576 n.
14. Porges v. U. S. Mtge. & Trust Co., 203 N. Y. 181, 96 N. E. 424 (1911).
15. See Merrill, Bankers Liability for Deposits of Fiduciary (1927) 40
HAnv. L. REv. 1077, favoring liability even in case of executors and trustees.
For the opposite point of view, see Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust
(1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 454; Note (1926) 34 YALE L. J. 854.
16. For an exhaustive and scientific articulation of a theory of which this
statement is an inadequate fragment, see Prof. Underhill Moore, An Institutional
Approach to Commercial Banking (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 703; Moore and Suss-
man, Legal and Institutional Methods of Debiting Direct Discounts (1930) 40
YALE L. J. 555; Moore and Sussman, Lawyer's Law (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 566.
17. Supra, notes 4 and 15.
1. 183 N. E. 309 (Ind. 1932).
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against the property. Notwithstanding this release, the judgment creditor
then recovered from the plaintiff, the original debtor-grantor, the balance of
the judgment debt. To reimburse himself for payment of the balance, the
plaintiff brought this action upon the defendant's contract with the second
grantee to satisfy the judgment, contending that he wvas a third party beneficiary
-of the contract, or, in the alternative, that he was subrogated to the rights of
the judgment creditor thereunder. The court, in affirming a judgment for the
defendant, refused to grant the reimbursement.
It further concluded that although the plaintiff might have derived an in-
cidental benefit from the performance of the defendant's promise to satisfy
the judgment, nevertheless, since the plaintiff was not contemplated as the
beneficiary of that promise, he could not recover from the defendant as a third
party beneficiary.2
The plaintiff must have been a surety for the balance of the judgment debt
in order to have a right of subrogation to the rights of the judgment creditor.a
It is frequently said that a person is a surety only when there is a fund or
other person primarily liable for the debtA Property which, as in the prin-
cipal case, is subject to resale to satisfy the balance of a debtG is considered
such a fund primarily responsible,0 and all prior grantors are sureties for the
liability of that fund.7 Therefore, the plaintiff as a surety in the principal
case, would have recourse by subrogation to the land for reimbursement. But
the plaintiff was precluded from recovery upon this principle, inasmuch as the
judgment creditor had released the defendant of all claims against the property.8
A right of the plaintiff against the defendant might have been predicated
upon subrogation to the creditor's right against the defendant on his contract
to satisfy the judgment. But again, in order to be subrogated to this right
the plaintiff must have been a surety, and the defendant must have been pri-
marily liable for the balance of the judgment debt.0 If the first and second
grantees of the land had contracted to satisfy the judgment debt, the defendant
as last grantee would have been primarily liable for the debt, and all prior
grantors, including the plaintiff, -would have been sureties.1 o This is for the
reason that each graxtor-promisee would have had a right of action against
his grantee, and the last grantee would ultimately have had to pay the debt.
In such a situation the plaintiff as surety -would be subrogated to the rights
of the creditor against the last grantee. But in the principal case, the court
held; that since there was no chain of personal liability running from the
plaintiff to the defendant as last grantee, the defendant -was not primarily
2. See Irwin's Bank v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co., 195 Ind. 669, 145 N. E.
869 (1925).
3. SHErAON, SUBROGATION (2d ed. 1893) § 3.
4. STEARNS, SusmiSHIP (3d ed. 1922) § 5.
5. IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 834.
6. Hopkins v. Wolley, 81 N. Y. 77 (1880).
7. STEARNS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.
8. It is doubtful whether the judgment against the plaintiff in favor of the
creditor for the balance of the judgment debt was correct; for if the holder
of a lien releases the land after a conveyance, he thereby releases the liability
of the grantor-debtor. Townsend Savings Bank v. Munson, 47 Conn. 390
(1879) ; Paine v. Jones, 76 N. Y. 274 (1879).
9. See note 3, supra.
10. Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561 (1882).
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liable, and the plaintiff could not be subrogated as surety to the creditor's rights
on the defendant's contract.
It is well settled that the holder of a judgment lien can sue a grantee who
has promised his grantor to satisfy the judgment; 11 and in most jurisdictions
this is true even though the grantor was not personally obligated to the judg-
ment creditor.1 2 The right of the judgment creditor is founded on the rights
of third party beneficiaries. But it is doubtful whether a remote grantor who
was not the contemplated beneficiary of the grantee's promise and whose
immediate grantee did not personally assume the debt, could be substituted
as the holder of the right of the creditor against the last grantee. This situ-
ation appears to have arisen for the first time in the instant case, and the court
declined to extend the rights of the creditor to such a remote grantor. Before
the balance of the original judgment debt was paid to the creditor, both the
plaintiff and defendant in this action were obligated to pay it on different
contracts, and the creditor could have collected from either one. In such a
situation it would seem equitable that they each pay a share of the obligation;
but whether the courts will recognize this equity remains for the future to
determine.
CONTINUATION OF BANK STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY ArEa TRANSFER
DOUBLE liability statutes are ordinarily interpreted as allowing bank stock -
holders to insulate themselves from individual liability by transferring their
stock.1 The statutory liability is considered a charge or lien on each share of
stock, attaching the moment the debt is contracted by the bank, and following
the stock into the hands of its successive owners. 2 On this theory, only the
stockholders at the time of the bank's suspension assume responsibility for its
debts and obligations, regardless of the time they were incurred.8
A recent Illinois case 4 is gignificant in its departure from the prevailing
view, and in its extension of double liability to former stockholders of an in-
solvent state bank. The defendants in that action had formerly been stock-
holders but had disposed of their shares in good faith two days to nine years
prior to the bank's insolvency. Despite the transfer, all were assessed sums
equal to the par value of their former stock holdings. The relevant sections
of the state constitution 5 and banking law 6 imposed an individual responsi-
bility upon every owner of stock "for all liabilities accruing while he or she
11. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
12. ANSON, CONTRACTS (4th Am. ed. 1924) § 290; Birke v. Abbot, 103 Ind.
1, 1 N. E. 485 (1885).
1. Whitney v. Butler, 118 U. S. 655 (1886); Loomis v. Verenes, 141 S. 0.
145, 139 S. E. 393 (1927) ; Stewart v. Allison, 36 Wyo. 202, 254 Pac. 117 (1927).
2. Thebus v. Smiley, 110 Ill. 316 (1884); Root v. Sinnock, 120 Il1. 350, 11
N. E. 339 (1887).
3. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S. W. 896 (1911); Foster v. Broas, 120
Mich. 1, 79 N. W. 696 (1899); Cleveland v, Burnham, 55 Wis. 598, 13 N. W.
677 (1882).
4. Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank, 182 N. E. 897 (Ill. 1932).
5. Ill. Const., art. 11, § 6.
6. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 16-1/2, § 6.
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remains such stockholder." 7 The court construed these provisions as imposing
liability upon all successive holders of the same shares of stock for deposits made
during their respective periods of ownership. The view that the statutory
liability attaches to the stock was expressly repudiated, and a transfer was
declared inoperative to release the vendor from personal liability.8 As a
corollary, the vendee could not be assessed for debts incurred before he became
a shareholder.9 And since the constitution suggested no method of terminating
this successive personal liability, the court took the position that the several
liabilities upon a single share of sfock may aggregate the product of the par
value of that share and the total number of its consecutive owners. 0
Decisions denying insulation from liability through a transfer of stock have
been rationalized in several ways. A few courts have regarded the statutory
liability of shareholders in corporations as comparable to the personal re-
sponsibility of partners for the debts of the partnership, and applied the
familiar doctrine that the withdrawal of a partner does not discharge his
individual responsibility for the existing obligations of the firm.21 Others
have sought to prevent stockholders suspicious of the banl's impending in-
solvency from transferring their shares to financially irresponsible parties.'2
A further consideration has been solicitude for those who became stockholders
during the closing days of the bank, and who would incur a double liability in
addition to the loss of their initial investment.' 3 Finally, a few cases have been
decided on the assumption that creditors entrust their funds to the bank, relying
on the security of the existing stockholders, so that to permit a transfer to
operate as a release from liability would be fraudulent as to depositors.' 4 These
contingencies are provided for in most jurisdictions by a statutory extension
of liability for periods of sixty days to one year after a transfer,'8 a remedy
which seems preferable to the indiscriminate assessment of prior stockholders.
7. Similar language is found in IowA CODE (1931) § 9251; Neb. Const., art.
12, § 7; NEB. CoL2P. STAT. (1929) c. 8, § 154; Wash. Cost., art. 12, § 11; WASH.
REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 3242; W. Va. Const., art. 11, § 6; W. VA.
CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 4, § 16.
8. For a case in accord with this view, see Morrisey v. Williams, 74 W. Va
636, 639, 82 S. E. 509, 510 (1914). In Ohio, the transferor is liable but ma$
seek indemnity from the transferee. Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667
(1881); Harpold v. Stobart, 46 Ohio St. 397, 21 N. E. 637 (1889).
9. Accord: Murphy v. Wheatley, 102 Md. 501, 63 Atl. 62 (1906); Dempster
v. Atwood, 118 Neb. 579, 225 N. W. 683 (1929); reversed on other grounds, 118
Neb. 589, 227 N. W. 451 (1929); Morrisey v. Williams, supra note 8.
10. This position is extreme and has no support even in jurisdictions where
the transferor is not released from liability. Pyles v. Carney, 85 W. Va. 159,
101 S. E. i74 (1919); cf. Thebus v. Smiley, supra note 2; Williams v. Hanna,
40 Ind. 535 (1872); Harper v. Carroll, 66 Minn. 487, 69 N. W. 610 (1896).
11. Coleman v. White, 14 Wis. 700 (1862); cf. Stockdale v. Maginn, 131 Pa.
St. 492, 19 Atl. 295 (1890).
12. Dunn v. Bank of Union, 74 W. Va. 594, 82 S. E. 758 (1914) ; see (1931)
37 W. VA. L. Q. 432.
13. Murphy v. Wheatley, supra note 9.
14. Wick National Bank v. Union National Bank, 62 Ohio St. 446, 57 N. E.
320 (1900); Dunn v. Bank of Union, supra note 12; cf. Murphy v. Wheatley,
supra note 9.
15. The Federal statute is typical: "The stockholders . . . who shal have
transferred their shares . . . within sixty days next before the date of the
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The significant feature of the instant decision is the increased protection
theoretically accorded bank depositors. However, so many practical difficulties
are apparent in collecting assessments from prior stockholders that it is ques-
tionable whether the Illinois court has devised a workable rule for giving
depositors substantial security.' 6 For the large number of stockholders, the
frequent transfers of stock, the death or insolvency of parties, and the removal
of former stockholders from the jurisdiction may well make the recovery of a
substantial amount from former shareholders highly speculative. And since
each creditor may look only to those who were shareholders at the time his
deposit was made, depositors are not treated equally 17 since less security is
afforded to early depositors. Moreover, with the numerous deposits and with-
drawals in active accounts, complications are certain to arise in computing
what part of such indebtedness existing at the time of his transfer should be
assessed against the transferor.' s An additional factor, admittedly conjectural,
is the extent to which the principal decision will deter prudent investors from
purchasing bank stock, where they remain responsible for future mismanage-
ment of the bank after the transfer of all ownership, interest, and control.10
The Supreme Court of Washington, in construing almost identical language
in its state constitution, avoided the conclusions reached in the instant cage.
2 0
The Washington court, after recognizing the ambiguity of the words "accruing
while they remain such shareholders," declared that debts and engagements of
a bank do not accrue until the obligation to perform arises. Since the bank
would normally meet its obligations as they matured, the only debts for which
shareholders would be responsible are those accruing upon the bank's insolvency.
Therefore, the court concluded, only present stockholders could be subjected to
the statutory assessments. By a similar construction of its own constitution,
the Illinois court might have avoided the scheme of double liability enforced by
the instant decision.
failure of such association to meet its obligations . . . shall be liable to the
same extent as if they had made no such transfer, 'to the extent that the
subsequent transferee fails to meet such liability." 88 STAT. 273 (1918), 12
U. S. C. § 64 (1926). There would be no liability, however, for obligations
incurred by the bank after the transfer. Mobley v. Phinizy, 172 Ga. 839,
157 S. E. 182 (1931); Bank of Dassel v. March, 183 Minn. 127, 235 N. W. 914
(1931). The Supreme Court has relieved the transferor of liability to sub-
sequent creditors even where the transfer was to a -financially irresponsible
person. McDonald v. Dewey, 202 U. S. 510 (1906); but cf. Newton v. Bennett,
159 Ga. 426, 126 S. E. 242 (1924); Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 583, 586.
16. Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472 (1812).
17. This inequality is heightened in Illinois, since creditors may individually
enforce the stockholders liability. Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, 116 N. H.
273 (1917); see Note (1932) 27 ILL. L. Rnv. 185.
18. Harper v. Carroll, supra note 10.
19. See dissent: Brown v. Hitchcock, supra note 8; of. MacNaghten, Tito
Double Liability Clause (1908) 28 CAw. L. J. 909.
20. Duke v. Johnson, 123 Wash. 43, '211 Pac. 710 (1923), overruling Shuoy
v. Holmes, 21 Wash. 223, 57 Pac. 818 (1899) and Fremont State Bank v.
Vincent, 112 Wash. 493, 192 Pac. 975 (1920) which are in accord with the
instant case. Iowa, with the same type, of constitutional provision, is in accord
with the Washington decision. Andrew v. Commercial State Bank, 206 Iowa
1070, 221 N. W. 809 (1928) ; Andrew v. People's State Bank, 211 Iowa 049,
234 N. W. 542 (1931).
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ENTRAPMENT AS DEFENSE IN PROSECUTION FOR PRoHIBIrIoN VIOLATION
Somm months ago the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, in the
case of Sorrells v. United States,1 reversed its former position with regard
to the defense of entrapment in criminal prosecutions, and held that instiga-
tion of violation of the National Prohibition Act through persuasion or other
inducement by government officers could not be pleaded as a defense. The
extreme position taken by the court in this decision and the lack of uniformity
in attitude among federal courts toward the defense of entrapment-due to
repeated refusals by the Supreme Court to accept certiorari in such cases-
were commented upon at the time in a note on this case,2 to which reference
is made for the facts in the case and a discussion of the problems involved.
Here it is to be added that the Supreme Court has reversed Sorrells v. United
States,3 and has established the validity of this defense.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court placed the decision on the ground
that, upon reasonable construction, the criminal offenses denounced by the
National Prohibition Act do not include such acts as are instigated by govern-
ment officials. The case was accordingly remanded for further proceedings.
Three justices,4 two of whom had dissented in the Olmstcad caseG found some
difficulty in reading into the statute this exclusion of cases involving entrapment,
but, in the spirit of that former dissent 0 preferred to ground the reversal upon
the broad public policy that courts of the United States should be closed to the
trial of a crime instigated by its own agents. They therefore recommended,
in a separate opinion, that the indictment should be quashed and the case
dismissed.
At first glance, sufficient reason for a minority opinion does not appear.
Conceptually, it is true, the minority might well have disagreed with the
majority's somewhat strained construction of the statute involved. But more
pragmatic reasons for the position of the minority may be discerned. Possibly
they wished to announce a position generally condemnatory of entrapment
and not restricted to the particular situation. Moreover, certain pro-
cedural implications of the two opposing positions are of considerable signifi-
cance. Under the majority view, evidence of entrapment must be introduced
under the plea to the general issue, and the fact of entrapment becomes a
matter which the jury must determine, and finally dispose of, as an element
of its finding of "guilty" or "not guilty" Under the minority view, however,
1. 57 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
2. 41 YALE L. J. 1249 (1932).
3. 53 Sup. Ct. 210 (1932). Mr. Justice Mcleynolds was of the opinion that
the judgment below should be affirmed.
4. Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone.
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). In this case evidence
for the government, which had been obtained by government agents through
"wire-tapping," in violation of the laws of the state where it occurred, was
admitted in a criminal prosecution, over the dissents of four justices (Mr.
Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone).
One of these four, Mr. Justice Butler, voted with the majority in the instant
case.
6. The precise questions presented in the two eases are quite distinct. The
objection in the dissenting opinions that the government should not be per-
mitted to come into court with unclean hands is, in this broad aspect, essentially
the same in both.
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the issue of entrapment is a matter for the determination of the court 7 at
any time and in any manner the question may be raised; 8 and upon a finding
of entrapment, before or after sentence,9 upon petition for a writ of habeas
corpus,10 or even after tender of a plea of guilty,11 the indictment must be
quashed and the case dismissed. 12
7. In case of doubt as to the facts the court may in any case submit the
issue of entrapment to the jury for advice. See principal case, supra note 3,
at 218; Jarl v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
8. Principal case, supra note 3, at 218.
9. United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913).
10. United States ex 'el. Hassel v. Mathues, 22 F. (2d) 979 (E. D. Pa.
1927).
11. United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S. D. Tex. 1918).
12. It is to be noted also that if the decision be based upon the ground
of public policy as in the dissent, and, in the words of Mr. Justice Roberts,
"the protection of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court," then
not only was the defense not created by the legislature, but furthermore the
legislature may not repeal it.
